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I. INTRODUCTION

I

n recent years it has become an oft-cited truism that the majority of
twenty-first century armed conflicts will contain a cyber element. The 2008
conflict between Russia and Georgia was the first publically available indicator of how cyber and conventional force might be used together in an
inter-State conflict.1 Beyond such a relatively clear-cut instance of fullblown international armed conflict, many ongoing situations of crisis, both
below and above the level of armed conflict, have attracted a significant
and persistent cyber component. Examples include the cyber intifada between Israeli and Palestinian hackers, which has continued since the increase in violence at the outset of the second intifada in 2000; the dispute
* Jann K. Kleffner, Head of the International Law Centre, Associate Professor of International Law, Swedish National Defence College; Heather A. Harrison Dinniss, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Law Centre, Swedish National Defence College.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Lisen Bergqvist.
1. It should be noted that the attacks against Georgia were not attributed to the Russian Federation, but rather to so-called “patriotic hackers.” Analysts did note, however,
the high degree of coordination between the actions of the conventional armed forces and
the targets of the cyber attacks. For a summary of the reports on the cyber incidents, see
ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS (2010).
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between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, which has an ongoing and pernicious cyber element involving groups on both sides with varying degrees
of alleged State sponsorship; and the Arab Spring, in which many of the
States involved used a variety of Internet surveillance, monitoring, censorship and control techniques, and in some cases—notably Tunisia and more
recently Syria—hacked the accounts and Internet content of individuals
engaged in the revolution.2
At the same time, there is a discernible trend on the part of the UN Security Council to authorize various forms of peace operations tasked with
an array of functions that are deployed into situations of armed conflicts
and other crises. A combination of both trends—the increase of conflict
and crisis situations with a cyber component and the deployment of complex peace operations—makes it only natural to assume that peacekeepers
will increasingly find themselves on missions in which cyber incidents will
occur during, following or even in the absence of, conventional hostilities.
Indeed, recent reports have raised the concept of stand-alone cyber peacekeepers. The suggestion that the United Nations should employ specific
personnel to deal with the increasing number of cyber incidents taking
place between States is indicative of the relevance of cyber operations for
the conduct of UN-mandated peace operations.3 Although the feasibility
of cyber-only peacekeeping occurring outside the context of a military operation has been largely dismissed by technical experts, 4 from a purely legal
perspective it would certainly be within the purview of the Security Council
to determine that cyber operations (whether in a specific situation or as a
more general concept) amount to a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter and to authorize those actions that it
considers appropriate.5

2. BEN WAGNER, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: NEW PATHS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE INTERNET IN EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY 6–13 (2012); Ben Brumfield, Computer
Spyware is Newest Weapon in Syrian Conflict, CNN (Feb. 17, 2012, 4:41 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2012/02/17/tech/web/computer-virus-syria.
3. Susan Watts, Call for Cyberwar “Peacekeepers” Force, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012, 17:40
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9687338.stm.
4. Ellyne Phneah, Idea of Cyber Peacekeepers Premature, “Redundant,” ZDNET NEWS (Feb.
6, 2012, 10:35 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/idea-of-cyber-peacekeepers-prematureredundant-2062303742/.
5. See generally HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF
WAR 109–13 (2012).
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What then are the legal parameters governing peace operations with regard to ongoing cyber threats? Do peacekeepers’ responsibilities extend to
monitoring cyber threats? When may a peace operation be mandated to
conduct cyber operations? How may peacekeepers respond to a cyber attack against them? Are there any legal constraints on a troop-contributing
State conducting cyber operations outside the mission area? These are
some of the pertinent questions that arise. Answering them from an international law perspective will very much depend on the specifics of the
cyber threat, the precise mandate of the peace operation and the operational cyber capabilities of troop-contributing States, among other considerations. We will, therefore, approach the issue in the following manner. First,
we will briefly set the general context by defining and describing contemporary peace operations. We will then address the general law applicable to
peace operations. Finally, we will discuss the potential types of cyber operations and the legal challenges they pose in more detail.
II. PEACE OPERATIONS DEFINED
For the purposes of this article, peace operations may be defined broadly
to include not only traditional peacekeeping operations based on the three
core principles of consent, impartiality and the use of force only in selfdefense and defense of the mandate, but also peace enforcement operations authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and peace building
operations. Chapter VII enforcement differs fundamentally from other
peace operations in that it does not require the consent of the target State
or entity, and need not be impartial, reactive or restricted to defensive
measures.6 Of particular importance in the cyber context, enforcement
measures may also be directed against non-State entities that are deemed to
pose a threat to international peace and security. Whether authorized by
the Security Council under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter (or under
Chapter VIII in the case of regional peacekeeping operations), the legitimacy of the operation flows from the Council’s primary responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security, which may be carried out by means of
the mandate.7

6. Terry D. Gill, Legal Characterisation and Basis for Enforcement Operations and Peace
Enforcement Operations under the Charter, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 85 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010).
7. Id. at 138.
514

Legal Aspects of Cyber Activities in Peace Operations

Vol. 89

Peace operations have changed dramatically since they began in 1948.
In addition to the introduction of enforcement operations in ongoing conflicts, even traditional peacekeeping operations have expanded into complex and multi-dimensional operations. Long established responsibilities of
peacekeepers, such as monitoring ceasefires, are now supplemented by
tasks which include, inter alia, the promotion of a stable environment,
maintenance of public order, provision of humanitarian assistance, and
protection of civilians from violations of humanitarian and human rights
law to the extent possible under the terms of the mandate and the operational capabilities of the particular mission.8 In future operations, all of
these tasks may include a cyber component. The utility of cyber operations
in more robust peace operations, including peace enforcement operations,
is also apparent. For example, the ability to prepare the battlespace, neutralize networks and uncover and obtain documentary evidence will be useful
tools in carrying out particular operations. The type of operation and its
constituting mandate are important in determining what cyber operations
can be undertaken by a mission.
III. LAW APPLICABLE TO PEACE OPERATIONS
The conceptual underpinning of, and the law applicable to, each type of
operation depends on a complex interaction of general international law,
human rights law, international humanitarian law and the domestic laws of
both the host and troop-contributing States. However, the essential distinction in determining the applicable international legal framework is between
those peace operations that fall below the threshold of armed conflict, for
which the primary legal framework governing the operation (and any cyber
operations which form part of it) is human rights law, and those which occur above that threshold. For operations occurring above the threshold, the
law of armed conflict may apply.
A. The Mandate
The principal legal parameter determining the permissibility of actions taken by a peace operation is the mandate established by the Security Council.
8. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 24 (2008), available at http://pbpu.unlb
.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf [hereinafter Capstone Doctrine].
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It may range from a limited mandate to monitor a peace agreement or
ceasefire to a more ambitious one that includes tasks such as protection of
civilians, creating a safe and secure environment and training of both civilians and armed forces.9
Under Article 41 of the Charter, the Security Council may also mandate
non-forceful measures be taken in situations it deems to be a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Such enforcement
measures may include, inter alia, partial or total disruption of telecommunications which may well contain a cyber element. Although authorized under Chapter VII and thus not requiring the consent of the host State, such
operations fall somewhere between traditional peace operations and the
more robust peace enforcement operations that have become common in
recent years. Needless to say, not all cyber operations can be treated alike;
those which would amount to a use of force would not fall within any
mandate provided under Article 41. Whether a cyber operation amounts to
a use of force or remains below that threshold raises issues identical to
those discussed elsewhere in the present volume.10
B. Human Rights
For peace operations falling beneath the threshold of armed conflict, the
primary legal paradigm is that of human rights. This includes both peacekeeping operations conducting the more traditional tasks for which the use
of force is a last resort in personal and unit self-defense or defense of the
mandate, and those authorized under Chapter VII for which the right to
use “all necessary means” is authorized, but in which peacekeepers are not
involved as combatants in an armed conflict.
Peace operations below the armed conflict threshold may, for instance,
involve monitoring the implementation of, and compliance with, a peace
agreement, or providing security in a post-conflict environment. In these
cases, the international legal framework governing cyber operations is in9. For a good illustration of an ambitious mandate, see the United Nations Mission in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) mandate, containing by some counts no
less than forty-nine different tasks for the operation. S.C. Res. 1565, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1565 (Oct. 1, 2004) and resolutions and documents referenced therein [hereinafter
MONUC Mandate].
10. See, e.g., William Banks, The Role of Counterterrorism Law in Shaping ad Bellum Norms
for Cyber Warfare, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 157 (2013); Laurie R. Blank, International Law and Cyber Threats from Non-State Actors, id. at 406; Noam Lubell, Lawful Targets in
Cyber Operations: Does the Principle of Distinction Apply?, id. at 252.
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ternational human rights law to the extent that the operation’s functions
are being exercised in a way that can be equated with the exercise of jurisdiction by a State.11 States are bound by both international conventions and
customary international human rights law. Several court decisions and quasi-judicial determinations have held that States’ human rights law obligations do not automatically cease to apply in extraterritorial peace operations, provided that jurisdiction is exercised.12
Admittedly, there is no universal consensus on this question. The United States is one of the prominent opponents of the extraterritorial application of human rights law. However, both universal and regional human
rights bodies, as well as a significant number of individual States have accepted—or have had to accept—that human rights law does not automatically cease to apply when operating beyond the State’s borders. Although
the question of when a State exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction has been
addressed in numerous cases under the different human rights instruments,
it will not be addressed in detail in this article beyond noting that the test
may generally be seen as one of effective control over territory, or authority
and control over persons.13
International organizations such as the United Nations are also bound
by customary international law, including human rights law. As with States,
if and when an international organization exercises effective control over
territory or physical control over one or more persons, the international
organization is bound to respect the human rights of those who find themselves within its jurisdiction. In the case of the United Nations, the binding
force of international human rights law flows from its international legal
personality, and is further strengthened by the UN Charter, the UN Safety
Convention,14 and their internal rules and practice.15

11. Jann K. Kleffner, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: General Issues, in
THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 6,
at 67.
12. The International Court of Justice, UN Human Rights Committee, European
Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have each
found that their instruments apply extraterritorially on the basis of jurisdiction.
13. See generally MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); Ola Engdahl, The Future of
Human Rights Law in Peace Operations, in LAW AT WAR: THE LAW AS IT WAS AND THE LAW
AS IT SHOULD BE 105 (Ola Engdahl & Pål Wrange eds., 2008).
14. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9,
1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363 [hereinafter UN Safety Convention].
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Cyber operations carried out in the context of peace operations below
the threshold of an armed conflict are thus governed by such human rights
law provisions as the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of
association, etc., provided that the person whose rights are at issue finds
himself or herself within the jurisdiction of the international organization
or troop-contributing State. While the legal basis to conduct cyber operations may stem from the authorization in the Security Council resolution or
from self-defence, the actual conduct of such operations is subject to the
constraints of human rights law. The UN Human Rights Council has confirmed that “the same rights people have offline must also be protected
online.”16 In other words, if jurisdiction is being exercised in a peace operation and it is considered necessary to gather intelligence or conduct operations in the cyber realm—for example, in order to prevent so called “spoilers” from reigniting an armed conflict or to prevent online postings that
incite racial hatred—interference with cyber infrastructure or data must be
carried out in compliance with the requirements of human rights law.
C. Law of Armed Conflict
When a peace operation involves the conduct of hostilities with a State or
organized armed group that crosses the threshold of armed conflict, the
law of armed conflict applies. The applicability of that body of law was
confirmed in the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin, “[o]bservance by UN
Forces of International Humanitarian Law,” which sets out the fundamental principles and rules applicable to UN peacekeepers.17 The bulletin’s importance has been reemphasized in “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” also referred to as the Capstone Doctrine.18

15. Kleffner, supra note 11, at 67. As examples, Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, which
establishes promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights as one of the purposes of the organization, and Decision No. 2005/24 of the Secretary-General’s Policy
Committee on Human Rights in Integrated Missions, which directs that human rights be
fully integrated into peace operations and that all human rights functions be coordinated
by one component. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 8, at 14, 27.
16. U.N. Human Rights Council, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights
on the Internet, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (2012).
17. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces
of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999).
18. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 8, at 15–16.
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While there is little debate over the application of the law to the troops
on the ground, a question does remain concerning which entity becomes
the party to the armed conflict—the troop-contributing State, the responsible international organization (whether the United Nations, NATO, etc.)
or both.19 Likewise, the determination of whether and for what time the
relevant legal actor is to be considered a party to an armed conflict involves
complex issues of fact and law that must be determined on a case-by-case
basis in light of the factual environment and the operationalization of the
mandate for the specific operation within that environment. Some of the
factors to be taken into account include, inter alia:









relevant Security Council resolutions;
specific operational mandates;
roles and practices actually adopted by the operation during the conflict;
rules of engagement and operational orders;
nature of the arms and equipment used by the force;
interaction between the operation’s forces and the parties involved in
the conflict, including any use of force between the operation’s forces
and the parties in an armed conflict, and the nature and frequency of
such force; and
the conduct of the alleged victim(s) and their fellow personnel.20

Similarly, whether individual members of a peace operation directly participate in hostilities requires a case-by-case assessment of whether the required threshold of harm, causation and belligerent nexus exists.21
Operations in which the hostilities amount to an armed conflict solely
between a peace operation and an adversary, with no other parties involved, will be fairly exceptional. It is more likely that a peace operation
will be deployed into an ongoing armed conflict or into a volatile situation
that then deteriorates into an armed conflict. As it is not a party to the con19. For a more detailed examination of the question than is possible in this article, see
Ola Engdahl, Multinational Peace Operations Force Involved in Armed Conflict: Who Are the
Parties?, in SEARCHING FOR A “PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY” IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 233 (Kjetil M. Larsen et al. eds., 2012).
20. Cf mutatis mutandis Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 234 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Mar. 2, 2009).
21. See generally NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009).
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flict, in these situations the peace operation cannot, without more, conduct
military operations that would be subject to the law of armed conflict, nor
can it be made the object of attack, whether through cyber means or otherwise. The right to conduct operations governed by the law of armed conflict requires that the peace operation be a party to the armed conflict. If it
is not, its members enjoy the protection that international law provides to
civilians, as well as the specific protections provided by the UN Safety
Convention.
Finally, although controversial and the subject of much scholarly debate, the law of occupation may also apply to peace operations in certain
circumstances, whether de jure or by analogy.22 It is sufficient for the purposes of this article to note that territory is only considered occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of the occupying force and the law
extends only to the territory where that authority has been established and
can be exercised.23 While cyber operations may be used in exercising an
occupying power’s authority, they would not be sufficient on their own to
establish an occupation.24 Thus, the use of cyber operations to project the
execution of a peace operation’s mandate into areas outside its effective
physical control, for example, by monitoring communications, would not
extend the application of the law of occupation to those areas.
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the general legal framework
applicable to different types of cyber operations and the different contexts
in which such cyber operations may occur. These scenarios are: first, deployment of a peace operation into a situation of ongoing cyber operations
between third parties; second, the use of force by a peace operation in response to cyber attacks; third, cyber operations conducted by a peace operation to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and,
fourth, the conduct of offensive cyber operations by peace operations. Although these different scenarios may overlap to a certain extent, they raise
distinct legal issues; hence, they will be treated separately.

22. See, e.g., Tristan Ferraro, The Applicability of the Law of Occupation to Peace Forces, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE OPERATIONS 133
(Gian L. Beruto ed., 2008).
23. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
24. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE ch. VI cmt. ¶ 3, at 196 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
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IV. SITUATIONS WHERE THERE ARE ONGOING CYBER OPERATIONS
When peacekeepers find themselves deployed in a situation in which there
are ongoing cyber operations between third parties (State-based or otherwise), the mission’s obligations and authority with regard to their response
to those acts will be dependent on its mandate. However, some general
observations may be made.
Clearly, when a peace operation is specifically tasked with acting in situations where there are ongoing cyber operations, it will be authorized to
monitor and conduct cyber operations in response to cyber threats. Given
the differing capabilities of troop-contributing States in terms of expertise
and equipment, however, it seems likely that any specific requirement will
contain caveats in terms of acting within the mission’s capabilities and resources.25
A more likely—and perhaps more interesting—scenario may occur
when a peace operation is tasked by the Security Council with deploying
into an ongoing security situation that contains a cyber element, but where
the mandate does not expressly refer to cyber operations.26 For example,
two of the traditional tasks of peacekeeping operations have been to promote a safe and secure environment and create the conditions for a lasting
political solution to a conflict through the monitoring of a ceasefire and the
parties’ adherence to their commitments under the agreement. In such a
case, the generic mandate may be interpreted broadly enough to include the
monitoring of Internet traffic, as well as monitoring activities in physical
space; however, the permissible methods used to perform those tasks will
differ depending on the robustness of the mandate and the level of the
25. Similar wording is currently used with respect to protection of civilians in other
peace operations. See, for example, MONUC, which is authorized “within its capabilities and
in area where its armed units are deployed . . . to ensure the protection of civilians.” S.C.
Res. 1592, ¶ 5, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1592 (Mar. 30, 2005) (emphasis added). The initial instructions to the African Union mission in Darfur provided that it was to “[p]rotect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity within resources and capability.” Communiqué, Peace and Security Council (Oct. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/news_events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Communiqu
%C3%A9%20_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf (emphasis added).
26. This article will restrict itself to the use of technology for monitoring cyber operations. For a discussion of some of the issues raised by intrusive intelligence gathering in
peacekeeping operations, see Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence
Gathering, 28 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 687 (2007); A. Walter Dorn,
The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping, 12 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 414 (1999).
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threat. For example, although all data traffic coming into and out of the
mission’s networks can be monitored as a matter of good network security,
the permissibility of using particular technologies, such as deep packet inspection (DPI),27 outside of the mission’s own networks depends on
whether the applicable law permits those actions.
As noted above, both troop-contributing States and the United Nations
must comply with human rights law in peace operations in areas subject to
their jurisdiction. In the scenario of conducting DPI, the human rights of
privacy and freedom of expression come to the fore. Neither of these
rights are absolute. International human rights law permits certain interferences with them for reasons of national security and public order.28 Such
exceptions are subject to proportionality requirements. Thus, the parameters established for the use of DPI technology would need to be carefully
thought through to avoid casting too wide a net.29
It should also be noted in considering multinational operations that in
addition to differing approaches to the extraterritorial application of human
rights law, judicial approaches to the use of DPI technologies also vary depending on the domestic jurisdiction. The United States and European Union member States, for example, have adopted different standards. Ongo27. Deep packet inspection involves looking at the content of the packets of information that make up a data stream, rather than merely the TCP/IP routing information
contained in the header of the packet. While there are legitimate uses for deep packet inspection that could be valuable to a UN mission (for example, prioritizing particular kinds
of data traffic, e.g., Skype), any use that makes the content of the packet available to
someone other than the sender and receiver of the message may risk infringing the right to
privacy by arbitrarily interfering with communications. Additionally, European Union
(EU) member States may run afoul of the EU framework directive on privacy and electronic communications and the EU data protection directive. Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council (Oct. 24, 1995), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.
28. Cf. Article 19(3)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Although Article 17 on the right to
privacy contains no explicit reference to exceptions on grounds of national security and
public order, it allows for such exceptions, provided an interference with a person’s privacy is neither arbitrary nor unlawful.
29. In the words of the Human Rights Committee, restrictions on the right of freedom of expression “must be ‘provided by law’ [and they] may only be imposed for one of
the purposes set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and they must be justified as being ‘necessary’ for . . . one of those purposes.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 10: Freedom of Expression (Art. 19), U.N. Doc. HR1/GEN/1/rev.1
(June 29, 1983).
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ing court cases are in the process of determining the contours of the right
of government entities to engage in such behaviors. While the law remains
far from settled at the time of this writing, rules of engagement for peace
operations deployed in situations where there are ongoing cyber operations
should be drafted in such a manner that the permissible limits on the use of
DPI or other Internet surveillance technologies are clear. It makes no difference whether the peace operation is conducted with the consent of the
host State or the Security Council has authorized the use of “all necessary
means” as the rights’ holder is the individual. While a Chapter VII mandate
would allow States to claim legal authority for surveillance or interception,
it is likely that most complaints regarding this technology would relate to
the alleged arbitrariness of the surveillance or interception. Differences in
interpretation may then be reflected in the national caveats of the troopcontributing States.
Once the applicable law for a peace operation has become the law of
armed conflict, the problem is significantly alleviated. Although human
rights law continues to apply during armed conflict,30 the law of armed
conflict permits the employment of those measures necessary for obtaining
information about the enemy.31 In fact, parties to an armed conflict are
obliged to do so in order to meet the required precautions in attack. Such
specific regulations in the law of armed conflict would prevail over the
more generic conflicting rules of human rights law (lex specialis derogat lege
generali).
V. USE OF FORCE IN RESPONSE TO CYBER ATTACKS
Despite the protections afforded to UN personnel,32 peace operations have
increasingly come under attack from those seeking to derail fragile peace
processes or manipulate hostile environments for their own purposes.
While there is no public record to date on the use of cyber attacks against
UN peace operations specifically, other UN organs and the armed forces
30. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
31. Hague Regulations, supra note 23, art. 24.
32. Protection of UN peacekeepers may stem from their status as civilians under the
law of armed conflict or specific treaty protections provided by the UN Safety Convention, supra note 14, and its Optional Protocol. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, G.A. Res. 60/42, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/42 (Jan. 6, 2006).
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of troop-contributing States have been the subject of cyber operations.33
There is no reason to believe peace operations will remain untouched by
this phenomenon. How then may a peace operation respond to such attacks?
In the first instance, peace operations may be specifically authorized by
the mandate to use force to protect its personnel, facilities, installations and
equipment.34 Even absent such an explicit mandate, it is submitted that
peace operations also have the authority to use force in response to cyber
operations directed against them as an exercise of self-defense, either by an
individual soldier, the unit or in extended self-defense (i.e., defense of the
mandate.)
At their inception, UN peace operations operated under the principle
of non-use of force except in self-defense. The notion of self-defense has
subsequently come to include the authority to use force in response to
armed attempts to prevent them from carrying out their mandate.35 Defense of the mandate is now part of the approved UN guidelines and regulations for peacekeeping operations.36 The right to use force against armed
attempts to interfere with the execution of the mandate is not limited to
operations authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is equally
available in more traditional peacekeeping operations, although these operations must also conform with the “bedrock principles of UN Peacekeep-

33. For example, Operation Shady RAT, which was a five-year espionage operation
discovered in 2011. It was conducted by an unnamed State actor and directed against multiple entities (companies, governments and non-governmental organizations), including
the United Nations. There have also been other low-level attacks specifically directed
against UN agencies by non-State groups and individual actors. See Dmitri Alperovitch,
Revealed: Operation Shady RAT, MCAFEE (2011), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/
white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf; United Nations Agency “Hacking Attack”
Investigated, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2011, 3:58 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology15951883.
34. See, e.g., the MONUC mandate, which authorizes MONUC to use all necessary
means within its capability and in the areas where its armed units are deployed “to ensure
the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment.” MONUC Mandate, supra note 9, ¶¶ 4(c), 6.
35. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 8, at 34.
36. Hans F.R. Boddens Hosang, Force Protection, Unit Self-Defence, and Extended SelfDefence, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS,
supra note 6, at 418.
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ing, namely impartiality and the necessity of consent and maintenance of
consent of all parties to a conflict.”37
What emerges from the foregoing as important in an examination of
the legal parameters governing the use of force against cyber attacks is that
the notion of self-defense in the context of peace operations can take on
different meanings. It can mean personal self-defense by an individual soldier, unit self-defense or extended self-defense of the mandate. A distinction between those different forms of self-defense is legally relevant because the quintessential requirements for a lawful invocation of any of
these, i.e., necessity and proportionality, will lead to different results as to
the permissible degree of the use of force.38
When a cyber operation directed against a peace operation is severe
enough to amount to armed force—that is, it causes death or injury to persons, or physical damage, including loss of functionality, to property and
equipment—UN peacekeeping forces are authorized to use force in selfdefense to the extent that such use of force complies with the requirements
of necessity and proportionality. In other words, the use of force must be
necessary to achieve the objective of defending the force and the amount
of force must be proportional, that is, it must not greatly exceed the scale
and intensity of the attack against which force is used in self-defense.39 If a
cyber operation interferes with the peace operation in such a manner that
peacekeeping forces cannot perform their mission (e.g., the command and
control systems of the operation have been compromised by a cyber attack) the UN forces would be entitled to use force in defense of the mandate under the same conditions. The use of force by the peacekeeping
forces may be kinetic or cyber in nature.
A separate question is the right of a UN peace enforcement operation
authorized under Chapter VII to use force against cyber threats that do not
themselves amount to a use of force, but which nevertheless interfere with
the ability of the enforcement operation to carry out its tasks. When peace
enforcement operations are mandated under Chapter VII to use all neces37. TERRY D. GILL ET AL., GENERAL REPORT FOR THE 19TH CONGRESS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR 20 (2012), available
at
http://ismllw.org/congres/2012_05_01_Quebec_General%20Report_CongressEN.pdf
38. With regard to personal self–defense, see Hans F.R. Boddens Hosang, Personal
Self-Defence and Its Relationship to Rules of Engagement, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 429. With regard to
force protection and extended self–defense of the mandate, see Hosang, supra note 36.
39. GILL ET AL., supra note 37, at 10.
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sary means, such operations are authorized to enforce the mandate at all
times. Consequently, enforcement authority is not limited to defense
against armed interference (reactive), but extends to enforcing any element
in the resolution in order to restore or maintain international peace and
security (proactive).40
Ironically, the usual difficulty in positively attributing the source of
cyber threats and distinguishing between those that constitute attacks and
those that are mere criminal acts may be less problematic in peace operations. When cyber operations are conducted against a peace operation that
interferes with carrying out the mandate, the peace operation may respond
in self-defense or defense of the mandate regardless of the origin of the
attack. Likewise, if the Security Council mandates a peace operation to
maintain law and order, contributing States should use all means reasonably
available to them to implement the mandate.41 Thus, the international force
can deal with cyber threats that may destabilize the peace operation.
Recent events in which significant unrest has been created by cyber activities illustrate the relevance of this point. For example, in August 2012, a
mass exodus of twenty to thirty thousand migrant workers from Bengaluru
to their home States in northeastern India was prompted by the combination of SMS, social media and morphed photos appearing to depict violence against Muslims.42 While the majority of messages appear to have
been sent by bulk SMS text and MMS messages, social media and websites
have borne the brunt of the government’s response to the crisis. In addition to issuing public statements and imposing a ban on bulk text messages, the Indian government blocked 245 webpages for “hosting provocative
and harmful content” and has said it will share evidence with the government of Pakistan to back claims that the messages came from that country.43 If a peace operation mandated with the maintenance of law and order

40. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 8, at 34–35; Hosang, supra note 36, at 419.
41. Timothy McCormack & Bruce M. Oswald, The Maintenance of Law and Order in
Military Operations, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 460.
42. In an indication of the dangerous inaccuracy of such media, early figures placed
the number of workers fleeing at three hundred thousand.
43. India to Share Exodus Messages Proof with Pakistan, BBC NEWS (Aug. 21, 2012, 00:15
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-19328364; India Blames Pakistan for
Exodus of Migrant Workers, BBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2012, 6:22 PM), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-19309982; State Govts Providing Enough Security to NE
People: Centre, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.hindustantimes.com/India526
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were confronted with a similar situation, it stands to reason that it could
take similar measures, provided that such measures were necessary and
proportional under the circumstances.
VI. CYBER OPERATIONS TO PROTECT CIVILIANS
Following a series of tragic incidents, the Security Council has increasingly
granted peace operations the authority to use force to “protect civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence.”44 The mandate to protect civilians is typically limited to the extent that such protection is possible and
within mission capabilities. Conceptually, the right to use force to protect
civilians can be viewed, in part, as an extension of the domestic law concept of the right of individual self-defense, which generally allows for defense of a third party, and, in part, as having a distinct basis in the express
provisions of the operation’s mandate and its attendant rules of engagement.45 When endowed with such a mandate, a peace operation is entitled
to use force when the lives or safety of civilians come under imminent
threat of physical danger from a cyber operation, for example, the opening
of floodgates on a dam by cyber means. A more difficult question, however, is the ability of the peace operation to use force against a cyber operation that is not so directly linked to physical danger, because the mandate
to protect civilians is regularly limited to circumstances where the threats of
physical violence are “imminent.”
Unfortunately, what the Security Council means by imminence is not
clear. Political leaders, UN departments, the UN force commander and
national contingent commanders all have an impact on how this term—
and the mandate more generally—is interpreted and operationalized in the
field.46 As the Bangalore panic illustrates, cyber operations are certainly capable of making civilian populations believe they are in imminent physical
news/NewDelhi/Exodus-continues-30000-NE-people-left-Bangalore-in-3-days/Article1915431.aspx.
44. S.C. Res. 1590, ¶ 16(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005). The language
used by the Security Council in expressly providing for the protection of civilians has been
notably consistent over time. See generally VICTORIA HOLT & GLYN TAYLOR, PROTECTING
CIVILIANS IN THE CONTEXT OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: SUCCESSES, SETBACKS
AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 44–47 (2009).
45. GILL ET AL., supra note 37, at 22.
46. VICTORIA K. HOLT & TOBIAS C. BERKMAN, THE IMPOSSIBLE MANDATE?
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND MODERN PEACE
OPERATIONS 91 (2006).
527

International Law Studies

2013

danger, and, in certain circumstances, cyber operations are linked with very
real physical threats. For example, repressive regimes use cyber operations
to locate, track and surveil opposition networks and potential dissidents. 47
Whether the correlation between tracking the civilian subjects of that surveillance and their ultimate death or disappearance is direct enough to argue that the imminence requirement is satisfied will depend very much on
the context. When the condition is met, the legal justification required for
the destruction of the functionality of the surveillance system or the relevant part of it, whether by kinetic or cyber means, may flow from the explicit mandate to protect civilians, or if an explicit mandate to protect civilians is absent, such a legal justification could arguably flow from an extended concept of the right of self-defense.
Irrespective of the legal justification, the use of force to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence is constrained by the principles of necessity and proportionality. Both principles would, as a general
rule, militate against the necessity of the use of lethal force in response to
cyber operations that are the source of an imminent threat. This is because
it will generally be possible to counter a cyber threat by technological
measures, such as diverting a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack
stream or blocking a port, rather than using lethal force against the person
conducting the attack. Given the non-linear progression of technological
development, however, the use of force cannot be ruled out. Moreover, as
noted previously, the mandate to protect civilians is typically expressed in
terms of “to the extent possible” and “within mission capabilities.” To
date, peace operations, particularly those conducted under the command
and control of the United Nations, have had limited technological capacity
for intelligence and information analysis48 and thus may not possess the
technical resources or abilities to prevent cyber operations from affecting
the civilian population.
The use of force in self-defense—including in defense of the mandate
or defense of civilians—does not necessarily mean the forces are involved

47. For an example from Syria, see WAGNER, supra note 2; Peter Apps, Disinformation
Flies in Syria's Growing Cyber War, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/08/07/us-syria-crisis-hacking-idUSBRE8760GI20120807.
48. A. Walter Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 275, 290–92 (Loch K. Johnson ed.,
2010).
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in an armed conflict such that the laws of armed conflict apply.49 It is only
when a peace operation becomes so actively engaged with a State or organized armed group that hostilities reach the level of armed conflict that the
law of armed conflict will apply.50 In such a case, the right to respond to
cyber operations is not constrained by the limits of self-defense; members
of the armed forces and military objectives of the adversary may be lawfully
attacked. Likewise, of course, the military personnel and military equipment
of the peace operation, including military cyber infrastructure and information systems, become lawful targets.
VII. PEACE OPERATIONS CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS
To date there is no public record of cyber operations being used by a UN
peace operation. The United States has stated that it used cyber operations
successfully in Afghanistan.51 However, given the dual nature of the U.S.
presence in the country and the double-hatted command of the troops involved, it is not possible to determine whether the cyber operations were
conducted under the auspices of the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force or the independent U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom. Cyber attacks to disrupt or disable the Libyan air defense
networks prior to strikes by coalition aircraft were also contemplated by
the United States in that UN-mandated operation, but the idea was discarded in the early stages of operational planning and conventional strikes
were ultimately used to achieve the same results.52 For a peace operation
constrained in its use of armed force and likely to be involved in a subsequent transition to reconstruction and development efforts, the ability to
49. Ola Engdahl, The Status of Peace Operation Personnel under International Humanitarian
Law, 11 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 109, 116 (2008);
Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military
Operations, 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (1998).
50. See supra pp. 518-520 for a discussion of the debate on where the threshold lies.
51. Raphael Satter, US General Says His Forces Carried Out Cyberattacks on Opponents in
Afghanistan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 24, 2012, http://seattletimes.com/html/
nationworld/2018983462_apusafghancyberattacks.html (“I was able to get inside his nets,
infect his command–and–control, and in fact defend myself against his almost constant
incursions to get inside my wire, to affect my operations.”). A Pentagon spokesman declined to elaborate on the comments, stating merely that the operations were properly
authorized and within the bounds of international law. Id.
52. Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks to Weaken Libya,
NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A1.
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merely turn off a network rather than destroying it means that cyber operations will prove a useful tool in the toolbox of peace operations.
Cyber operations may also allow the mission to project their mandate
into regions beyond its area of deployment, which it could not otherwise
reach with current capabilities. In addition to their utility for intelligence
and monitoring activities, cyber operations provide the ability to remotely
shut down the networks of opposing actors, allowing for a significant advantage to a mission seeking to disrupt the activities of those threatening a
peace process.
Furthermore, in many circumstances cyber operations provide a mission with a non-forceful method to influence the actors involved in the
process, consistent with the principle that a UN peace operation should
only use force as a measure of last resort after other methods of persuasion
have been exhausted.53 This includes enabling the mission to take action
against outside interference that may be inflaming an already tense situation. For example, the 2007 cyber incidents that accompanied rioting in
Estonia were largely conducted from outside the country.54 Attack scripts
were passed in Russian language forums and posted on Russian-hosted
websites. Similarly, websites hosting generic attack scripts for use in the
cyber elements associated with Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in
2008 and 2009 were hosted in multiple jurisdictions by both sides. A site
called “Help Israel Win” that sought volunteers for a botnet dubbed “Patriot” was moved multiple times in response to attacks from the opposing
side. Opposing hacker teams were located in multiple jurisdictions, and included hackers of Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, Turkish, Algerian and Moroccan origin.55 Comparable situations of outside interference could easily confront a peace operation.
While the specific legal issues raised depend, among other things, on
the nature of the cyber action, the type of mandate, applicable law and the
facts on the ground, a number of progressively offensive oriented cyber
activity examples may prove illustrative of some of the issues involved.

53. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 8, at 35.
54. See TIKK, KASKA & VIHUL , supra note 1, at 23 & nn.76–88.
55. GREYLOGIC, PROJECT GREY GOOSE, PHASE II REPORT: THE EVOLVING STATE
OF CYBER WARFARE ch. 2 (2009), available at http://fserror.com/pdf/GreyGoose2.pdf.
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A. Removal or Blocking of Online Content
Online content—whether extremist websites, highly offensive video footage or social media sites—have the potential to inflame, exacerbate and
ignite tensions on the ground in areas where the peace operations are
working. In some cases, online content may even be a direct incitement to
physical violence. Removal of the content could, therefore, contribute to
the promotion of a safe and secure environment in accordance with a
peace operation’s mandate. If webhosts and Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) are unable or unwilling to remove the content, can peace operations
proactively remove or block access to such materials? One of the factors
will be where the content is posted. Peace operation mandates are generally
geographically constrained to a specific territory or area of deployment.
Thus, the authorization to act provided by the mandate—whether or not it
involves the use of force—will be limited to that territory.56 The same is
true of cross-border cyber operations conducted in an effort to remove
potentially inflammatory content from sites outside the mission area.
Blocking the availability of particular online content within the geographical confines of the mission area is a far easier way to accomplish the
same effect. The most extreme example of governmental intervention in
communications technology for security purposes is perhaps the Egyptian
government’s actions in completely shutting off access to the Internet for
four days during the Arab Spring. Other States have taken a more nuanced
approach by blocking specific sites or particular content. While States, such
as China, with its “great firewall,” and regimes in the Middle East and
North Africa that engage in heavy web filtering and censorship have technology in place to make such a task easy, other States also have the capacity
to engage in such behaviors.57 For example, India blocked access to approximately 250 websites in an effort to stop the spread of videos and images that caused the Bangalore panic. The Afghan government pushed Internet providers in that country to bar access to websites hosting an antiIslamic video in order to head off potentially violent demonstrations.58
56. The exception will be in situations when a peace operation is acting in unit or personal self-defense, which is an inherent right and not linked to the mandate. See generally
Hosang, supra note 36, at 418–27.
57. See generally, WAGNER, supra note 2.
58. Alissa J. Rubin, Afghanistan Tries to Block Video and Head Off Rioting, NEW YORK
TIMES (Sept 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/world/asia/afghanistantries-to-block-video-and-head-off-rioting.html?_r=0.
531

International Law Studies

2013

While it appears reasonable to assume that peace operations can block
the availability of particular online content within the geographical confines
of the mission area on similar legal grounds as provided for by a mandate
to protect civilians or one to provide a safe and secure environment, the
human rights implications of doing so, particularly for a peace operation
under UN command and control, are significant. In a “Joint Declaration
on Freedom of Expression and the Internet,” rapporteurs on freedom of
expression from the United Nations, Organization of American States and
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s representative on freedom
from the media stated, “[c]utting off access to the Internet, or parts of the
Internet, for whole populations or segments of the public (shutting down
the Internet) can never be justified, including on public order or national security
grounds.”59 Although not legally binding, given the breadth of the organizations represented in the declaration, this statement will carry significant
weight when applied to a UN peace operation. The right to freedom of
expression is not absolute, however, and while blocking entire sections of
the Internet may not be justified, restriction of certain content may be appropriate if authorized by the mandate, proportionate under international
standards and necessary to protect a recognized interest. Clearly, when the
content amounts to incitement to commit crimes, such as genocide or certain other forms of hate speech, blocking of content would be permissible
for the peace operation.
B. Neutralization of Command and Control and Air Defense Networks
The ability of cyber operations to neutralize networks without destroying
them may prove to be a valuable tool for peace operations. For example,
multiphase operations that involve policing no-fly zones or aerial monitoring of disarmament programs may initially benefit from suppression or
neutralization of the air defense networks. However, such networks will be
needed once peace is restored and the operation moves on to supporting
redevelopment.
59. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression & the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet,
¶ 6(b) (2011) (emphases added).
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Whether neutralizing, but not destroying, such a network is legally
permissible depends on the categorization of the acts and the mandate of
the particular operation. There has been a great deal of debate whether
mere neutralization of a network by cyber means would amount to an attack under the laws of armed conflict.60 Agreement appears to have been
reached that destruction of the functionality of objects, to include network
components, such that a physical component has to be replaced would
amount to an attack.61 The same analysis may be used in evaluating whether
actions by a peace operation constitute a use of force. Therefore, merely
turning a network off as a proactive measure would not overstep an authorization limiting the use of force to that necessary in self-defense.62
Other potential restrictions on taking such an action would be dependent
on the mandate for the particular operation and the associated rules of engagement.
Neutralization of computers engaging in cyber operations from outside
the area of operations, such as against international “spoilers” that take part
in DDoS attacks similar to those directed against Estonia, face the same
geographical constraints outlined in the previous section with regard to removal of content. At the same time, peace operation mandates in Security
Council resolutions almost always call on member States to provide assistance to peace operations. In some cases they require States to ensure that
their nationals, individuals and firms within their territory or subject to
their jurisdiction refrain from particular behaviors.63 As a result, peace operations are able to call on the member State in which the perpetrators are
located or of which they are nationals to assist in preventing “spoiler” activities and punishing those who engage in such activities. Simultaneously,
the peace operation could block and/or redirect the DDoS traffic emanating from particular Internet Protocol addresses using ISPs or webhosts located in the geographical area of the peace operation.

60. See, e.g., HARRISON DINNISS, supra note 5, at 196–202.
61. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 105–110.
62. Clearly, however, if the network had actually been used against aircraft involved in
the peace operation or indicated hostile intent, e.g., by acquiring a radar lock on an operation aircraft, any use of force against the system would be authorized as self-defense.
63. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 9, 19, 21, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011), concerning general assistance by UN member States to the UN-authorized Libya operation
and the specific tasks States were to take in support of the freeze on Libyan assets.
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C. Destruction of Surveillance or Command and Control Capabilities
When more destructive offensive cyber measures are envisaged, such as
those causing physical damage to equipment of the opposing party in nonself-defense circumstances, authorization must derive from the mandate.
As noted above, physical destruction by cyber means is a use of armed
force and must, therefore, be authorized by the Security Council. Since traditional peacekeeping missions are authorized only to use force in selfdefense as defined above, offensive cyber operations are not permitted.
Peace enforcement operations endowed with a Chapter VII authorization
to use “all necessary means,” may, on the other hand, use force to enforce
the mandate. Thus, offensive cyber operations causing damage, destruction
or personal injury are authorized in any situation that kinetic force would
be permissible, provided they are necessary to fulfill mission objectives.
Likewise, when members of the peace operation find themselves actively
engaged in hostilities under the laws of armed conflict, destructive offensive cyber operations may be used against military objectives in accordance
with that body of law.64
VIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis confirms that a detailed answer of the legal parameters governing peace operations that confront or conduct cyber operations
cannot be provided in the abstract. The mandates and capabilities of peace
operations and the contexts in which they are deployed are too varied and
complex. Nonetheless, one can draw some general conclusions.
First, it seems certain that cyber operations directed against or conducted by peace operations can be expected to increase. Second, it would
appear equally reasonable to assume that the majority of instances in which
peace operations are involved in cyber operations—either as actors engaging in such activity or as the object of cyber operations of other actors—
will take place when the peace operation is not a party to an armed conflict;
hence, it will not be operating under the law of armed conflict. To the extent this is true, international human rights law will remain at the fore as
the main international legal framework governing cyber operations.
Whether operating under a law of armed conflict regime or a human
rights regime, peace operations will always be able to conduct cyber opera64. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 10; Blank, supra note 10; Lubell, supra note 10.
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tions of some type. Indeed, the importance of cyber capabilities is likely to
increase in light of their operational utility and efficiency. Exactly what type
of cyber operation will be legally permissible, and how intrusive, disruptive
and offensive it may be, will however, ultimately depend on the specific
mandate.
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